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ABSTRACT
The Right to self-determination is a notion that grew out of the human rights
regime post World War II. It was one of the core ideas that drove the
decolonization of most of the world then colonized by European and Western
imperialism. This very idea helped liberate millions of people around the globe;
however, it failed to liberate indigenous peoples and communities who are still
under foreign domination and who are still marginally oppressed and heavily
discriminated against. Indigenous peoples are unique peoples with unique rights,
and my paper will argue that the notion of self-determination does apply to them
as peoples under international law. In mounting this argument I will assess
various perspectives on the legitimacy of this application. I will explain why it is
indeed legitimacy. In doing so I will discuss its recognition by the United Nations
Human Rights Council, the ECOSOC council, the Inter-American Court and
Commission on Human Rights, and the Nordic Countries of Europe. By tracing
the these peoples’ achievement of recognition under international law, I will
illustrate how what was once seen as a wholly domestic issue became an
international human rights law issue deeply rooted in the human rights regime that
was built to protect all peoples from abuses. This paper will argue that it is under
the Modern Custom Theory of International Customary Law (ICL) that UN
Declarations can be ‘crystallized’ into ICL, requiring they espouse a strong opinio
juris and have a strong moral content. I will argue that the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in particular Article 3, of Self-Determination has
been crystallized into international customary law.
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Introduction
Indigenous peoples’ legal fight for self-determination is their last struggle for survival.
For the past five hundred years, indigenous peoples have been “forcefully removed from
their lands, disposed of their natural resources, and discriminated against or simply
decimated.”1 There is an estimated 370 million indigenous peoples all over the world.
They are on all continents and many are amongst the world’s poorest people.2 According
to the latest United Nations report, issued in 2010, “While indigenous peoples make up
around 370 million of the world’s population, some 5 per cent, they constitute around
one-third of the world’s 900 million extremely rural poor people.”3 Their situation
according to the United Nations is critical. Indigenous peoples face systemic
discrimination and exclusion from political and economic power, often dispossessed of
their ancestral lands and deprived of their resources for survival, both physical and
cultural, even robbed of their very right to life.4 In Latin America for example, the
statistic of child mortality rates are 70% higher than a non-indigenous child.5
Indigenous peoples have characteristics that separate them from the rest of the
population,6 including “ethnic, religious, and linguistic”7 characteristics.8 Their survival
as a unique group of peoples is critical to our world’s diversity and a true test of
humanity, of the human rights legal regime and of nation states’ obligation to protect
them and grant them their human rights. Indigenous peoples’ rights fall deep within the
human rights regime that has grown since World War II. Since its inception indigenous
peoples were overlooked by this regime, designed as it was to protect human rights
1

Paul J. Magnarella, The Evolving Right of Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples, 14, St. Thomas
L.Rev. 425, (2001-2002) at 425.
2
Id. at 425-426.
3
UN Report State of the Worlds Indigenous Peoples Published in 2010, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP_web.pdf .
4
Id.
5
Supra note 1 at 4.
6
Id. at 4-5.
7
Id.
8
Magnarella supra note 1, Magnarella argues that “ in many cases of repressive majority-indigenous
relations, the classic unitary nation-states has proved to be a dangerous fiction. Attempts by states
governments to force diverse cultural populations into the majority ethnic mold have frequently led to
human rights abuses. Historically, diverse ethnic populations with a traditional of mutual animosity have
not found common citizenship in a single state to be sufficient basis for social harmony.” at 9.

generally; they were seen as being under the rubric of domestic affairs, not the
international community’s. Thankfully, this has changed, and globalization has made us
more interconnected – one of the changes that has put indigenous rights at the forefront
of international human rights affairs.
The right to self-determination has been legally codified in two Covenants: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 9 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR).10 Both stipulate, under
Article 1(1), that “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.” This right has been granted to peoples: to freely participate in the
civil and political life of whichever nation they reside within. This right was most
recently enshrined in the controversial United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),11 where it further validated indigenous peoples’ legal
right to seek self-determination under international law. This was the first time in
indigenous peoples’ legal history that their right to self-determination had been enshrined
in a document that recognizes their legal rights under international law.
While some scholars have contested the legal validity of such declarations and
resolutions, and others question the validity of international law generally, these remain
the legal instruments best suited to progress indigenous peoples’ right to selfdetermination. As I will argue, the law is a work in progress, and the crystallization of
international customary law is complex, I will do my best to explain how international
customary law is the best-equipped system of law to address and codify indigenous rights
law. I believe that as states and peoples become more interconnected the human rights
system, built over half a century ago, will finally begin to redress the social inequalities
and atrocities that have been committed and continue to occur to indigenous peoples
communities all around the world.
The right to self-determination itself remains a contentious legal debate in
9

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 16 December 1966
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm.
10
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 16
December1966, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm.
11
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) G.A. Res. 61/295 13
September 2007, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf .
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international and domestic law. It has often been received with hostility by nation states,
and with good reason. The traditional view on self-determination, and much of the
hostility towards it, is rooted in the Westphalia notion of absolute sovereignty. I believe
that this is, however, an incorrect notion. Most indigenous peoples and communities
around the world are not calling for the right to external self-determination or secession,
but rather for internal self-determination or autonomy within the nation-states they reside
within. What they are seeking is to finally be accepted as part of the state. I will further
analyze this in chapter two.
The discussion of indigenous rights takes place with the wider one of human
rights, and we must look at both within the framework of international law. International
law has progressed since World War II in line with the social needs of the international
community. We now live in a world that has 194 countries, and international law must
develop to meet the needs of all these countries collectively and individually. Existing
within the international law’s framework, international customary law was codified as a
law source by the International Court of Justice Statute, Article 38. As it is now written,
customary international law no longer applies to modern world affairs, for reasons I will
detail in this thesis. Some legal scholars argue that a new, progressive view of customary
international law, often referred to as “Modern Custom”, is more viable for meeting the
needs of the international community, and that the old “Traditional Custom” no longer
applies to human rights in the fast-paced world we live in.
This paper argues that the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples has
been codified into customary international law as a legal right. I base my view on the new
progressive theory often referred to as the “Modern Custom theory” of international law,
which deviates from the “traditional approach” to customary international law. Although
this modern theory is still not universally accepted, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) has ruled in important cases, citing only Opinio juris in the matter and thus further
validating this theory.
Chapter one will focus on defining customary international law (CIL). This
chapter is designed to look at the various theories and ways that (CIL) is codified; it
analyses various competing theories from legal scholars. The intention is to assess the
extent to which the right to self-determination of indigenous people has been codified
3

under international law. In defining CIL I will describe the three main theories of this
law: Classical, Traditional, and Modern. Clarifying this background is crucial, as some
legal scholars now contest the application of customary law to international law, while
others argue that customary law is necessary to meet the needs of the nations and peoples
operating in the evolving global sphere. I will argue that under these competing theories,
“modern custom” is the most relevant to human rights because it specifically codifies
indigenous rights law. More importantly I will focus on the argument of modern custom
and its ability to legally codify United Nations Declarations as International Customary
Law that espouses strong Opinio juris and strong moral content. Therefore, this paper
will focus on the modern theory of international law to argue that the right to selfdetermination has indeed been codified.
Chapter two of this paper will argue that the right to self-determination of
indigenous peoples under international law has been codified as customary international
law under the Modern Custom theory. Under the modern custom theory, I will argue that
human rights principles enshrined into UN Declarations or Resolutions can be
crystallized into ICL. This is based on the strong opinio juris and the strong moral
content (Lex ferenda) of the document being passed through the General Assembly. To
support this belief this chapter will provide four case studies that show a strong opinio
juris of state compliance with the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples from
both regional human right bodies and national state legislation to the Human Rights
Council.
For this paper, I will use the most widely used definition of ‘indigenous peoples’,
as adopted by the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Issues. This defines
Indigenous peoples in the following way:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present nondominant sectors of the society and are determined to preserve, develop, and
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories and their ethnic identity as
the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own
cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.12
12

ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS, Cambridge (2007)
4

This definition of what constitutes an indigenous person or community is still
contentious. There is no universally agreed upon definition of who or what constitutes an
indigenous person. However, this definition has been favored by most indigenous
communities worldwide because there is no one definition, it seems, that can include all
the indigenous populations of the world today. However, self-identification has been the
primary tool of representation for those identifying as an indigenous person or
community.

at 9. See also the study by Jose Martinez-Cobo titled, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations (1981), UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21, available at
http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/Library/Mart%C3%ADnezCoboStudy.aspx.
5

I. International Customary Law
A. Introduction

This chapter describes and critically evaluates the different theories of what constitutes
the way to declare International Customary Law (ICL). ICL is one of three main sources
of law that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) derives its laws and verdicts from. The
other two are the international conventions accepted by states as law and the general
principles accepted by states as law. The ICJ’s Statute Article 38 classifies all three
sources of law, so ICL is one of its main sources of law.13 By discussing what ICL is, and
by briefly describing the two key theories of applying it, Traditional, and Modern, I am
able to confront those legal scholars who argue that customary law does not suit
international law. I can then show the essential role it plays in regulating nation states and
their responses to the ongoing efforts of indigenous peoples to establish their right to selfdetermination.
I will argue that although ICL theories can all technically codify the right to selfdetermination, the modern theory is more applicable to indigenous rights and the human
rights regime as it exists under international law. I base this on the fact that the new
modern theory of ICL focuses more on opinio juris and lex ferenda than on lex late14 and
state practice. Put very simply, this means that modern theory accepts the notion that law
is made to guide practice, not merely to codify actions that already exist. Opinio juris is
the second element required in the formation of ICL; known as the ‘psychological
element’, it connects a state’s behavior with the custom they have chosen to follow. In
other words, it requires that the state acted out of a sense of legal obligation with the
custom and not out of habit, not for political reasons, and not because of the belief that
the custom was already guiding and regulating the state’s behavior. In addition, the state
acted as it did because there were legal consequences to not acting this way.
I will discuss in depth important ICJ cases in which the court has further validated
this notion of opinio juris as weighing heavily against the traditional view of state
14

Lex ferenda and lex late are Latin legal terms. Lex ferenda literally means what the law ought to be or
future law where as lex late means what the law currently is or as it is. One is a prescriptive term and one is
a descriptive term. I use these terms to articulate the need for improvement of indigenous rights, in
particular their right to self-determination.
6

practice.
While it can be argued that all theories are valid, it can be equally argued that all
theories are equally wrong and invalid. But at this point they are the only significant
theories at our disposal for resolving the issues addressed in this thesis. While I argue for
the use of Modern custom over the Traditional approach of custom, both have
fundamental theoretical problems that cannot be fully addressed within the sphere of this
paper. Nevertheless, I will attempt to explain why I view modern custom as providing the
best legal approach for establishing indigenous rights to self-determination in
international law. This view favors modern custom’s heavy reliance on opinio juris and
lex ferenda at least partly because it guides the law to what it should be over approaches
favoring states’ interests and the way they want the law to be applied.

1.

International customary law, the International Court of Justice, and its
Statute Article 38

The statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) describes custom as “evidence of a
general practice accepted as law.”15 Custom is generally described as having two
essential elements, “state practice and Opinio juris.”1617 This is the mostly widely
accepted definition and the traditional definition as well. These two elements are what
distinguish customary international law from other types of international law. The main
problem, however, and the source of controversy over this source of international law, is
how to measure and determine what has actually “crystallized” into ICL.18 This difficulty
is mostly due to the fact that different legal scholars approach ICLdifferently. While
some are more apprehensive and conservative with applying it, others argue, for instance,
15

Anthea Elizabeth Roberts. Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A
Reconciliation, Amer. J. of Law; Vol. 95. (2001) at 1.
16
Id. at 1.
17
HUGH THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION, (1972) Thirlway in his book
also contends that “ the generally held view of customary international law, which has been endorsed by
the International Court of Justice, is that the creation of a rule of customary international law postulates: (1)
a general practice of states and (2) the acceptance by states of the general practice as law.”
18
MARK E. VILLIGER. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES : A STUDY OF THEIR
INTERACTIONS AND INTERRELATIONS, WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1985) at 3.
7

for a more modern approach to it.

2. State Practice and Opinio juris: The two elements of International
Customary Law
State practice is often referred to as the “raw” element in the formation of ICL. State
practice, for the ICJ, can be any act or expression of, or on behalf of, a state that occurs in
relation to a custom or norm in international law. 19 According to the International Law
Commission (ILC), the following can be used to prove state practice: “treaties, decisions
of national and international courts, national legislation, diplomatic correspondence,
opinions of national legal advisors, and practice of international organizations.” 20
In ICL, state practice is the practice of nation-states who follow a norm, one that
could be written or not, out of a sense of obligation to that custom.21 How state practice is
actually measured is a much-debated issue in international law. Legal scholars will often
agree that there is very little international consensus on what actually counts as state
practice. 22 This ambiguity remains a renowned weakness (some would say a flaw) in
ICL. Some legal scholars argue that only the “physical acts of a state” 23 can constitute
the state practice of a state. Because it is nearly impossible to measure how many states
participate in a custom at any given point in time, it is almost impossible to measure the
exact role played by state practice in the formation of ICL.
Opinio juris is the second required element of ICL. A Latin term, Opinio juris is
seen as the “psychological element” in ICL.24 Opinio juris literally means an “opinion of
law or necessity.”25 It is the belief that an act by the state was carried out because of that
state’s sense of legal obligation.26 It helps distinguish acts by states done out of personal
interest from those they feel obliged to follow because of the law.27 The distinction is
19
20

Id. at 4.
Id.

21

Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005) at 4.
Id. at 23.
23
Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, AMER.J. OF INTL. LAW (1987) at 2.
24
Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 21, at 4.
25
Francesco Parisi, The Formation of Customary Law (2000) at 6.
26
Goldsmith and Posner supra note 21 at 23.
27
Id. at 23.
22
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difficult to draw precisely though, because it can convincingly be argued that the state
sees its self-interest as increased by acceding to laws that, while perhaps curtailing their
short-term interests, will benefit that state over the longer term. Here is the ambiguous
core of the issue of what exactly constitutes ICL. However, opinio juris has helped to
define what customary international law really is by 28 drawing so much attention to the
different motivations for following law – self-interest versus obligation.
ICL does not “arise and exist” immediately, or instantaneously,29 or organically.
Once created, often through treaties or declarations, it must be confirmed by repeated
state practice and opinio juris; at some point, this combination of state practice and
opinio juris is recognized as having proven that the custom or norm has ‘crystallized’ into
ICL.30 Exactly how much state practice, over precisely how long a period, is still up for
debate and no real consensus exists exactly, nor does anyone know exactly how many
states must participate in the practice. 31 The generally accepted requirement is that state
practice must be ‘consistent and widespread’. Monitoring and measuring the behavior of
the world’s 194 states accurately 32 remains a daunting challenge.
Another problem with measuring state practice is the question of which nationstates’ practice should we follow or observe to establish proof of ICL? Technically, and
according to the United Nations Charter, all states are equal and thus all states should
have the same weight politically. However, we know this to be untrue. Scholar Anthea
Roberts reflects on this issue by stating, “newly developing, and social states have
objected to customs as having been created by wealthy European and imperialistic
powers.” She continues, saying, “the legal fiction of free and equal states also masks the
reality of extreme variations of defacto power.”33
In another critique of this pattern of only counting western states as counting
28

Thirlway, supra note 17, at 47.
Jeremy Pearce, Customary International Law not Merely Fiction or Myth, Australian Intl. L.J. (2004) at 7
30
Roberts, supra note 15, According to Roberts, “Opinio Juris concerns statements of belief rather than
actual beliefs” at 1.
31
Thirlway, supra note 17, at 47.
32
Villiger, supra note 18, at 22; Villiger contends that:“In respect of the contribution of active state practice
for the formation or existence of a customary rule, the court has stipulated as an additional requirement, the
uniformity and consistency of the practice in question. In the North Sea cases, the ICJ demanded that:
‘Within the period (of time) in question, short though it might be, state practice, including that of states
whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of
the provision invoked.”
33
Roberts, supra note 15, at 12.
29
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towards the establishment of state practice, Roberts cites the Lotus Case, where “the
Permanent Court cited decisive precedents based on actions by only six western states.”34
This noted unfairness makes a myth of the ‘equalness’ of states on the international
plane.35 This is not merely to point out a flaw of the Westphalia-influenced traditional
view on ICL, but a pronouncement on the inequality in the system of creating law. This
disproportionate weighting of western states when recognizing state practice means, of
course, that less powerful states with little or no power in ‘crystallizing’ ICL are forced to
comply with norms they are powerless to influence. This is a huge problem that needs to
be addressed and, as I soon argue, one best addressed with modern custom theory’s
notion of how customary law should ‘crystallize’ into ICL.

B. The Modern Approach: Custom Theory Based on the Doctrine of Opinio
Juris

The endless debates about what international customary law is and how it is formed will
not end anytime soon, if ever. The precise status of ICL in international law seems to be
unknown, and while some scholars argue for the necessity of it, others call for its
“demise.”36 Whether or not it survives the scholarly debates, only time will tell. Legal
scholar Anthea Roberts starts her article, Traditional and Modern Approaches to
Customary Law: a Reconciliation, by saying that “the demise of custom as a source of
international law has been widely forecasted.”3738 Roberts contends, however, that the
rise of the human rights regime in the international sphere has helped in resurrecting ICL.
34

Id.
Pearce, supra note 29, Pearce in his article Customary International Law: Not Merely Fiction or Myth
(2003) he states that “Judge Hudson attempted to articulate his formula to clarify international customary
law, he provided it with five elements:
1. The Concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a type of situation falling
within the domain of international relations;
2. The continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time;
3. The conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing international
law;
4. The general acquiescence in the practice of other states; and
5. The establishment of each element by a competent international authority” at 6.
36
Roberts, supra note 15, at 1.
37
Id.
38
Id. Roberts also goes on to say that “ at the same time custom has become an increasingly significant
source of law in important areas such as human rights obligations” at1.
35
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Roberts says that the “codification conventions, academic commentary, and the case law
of the international Court of Justice have also contributed to a contemporary resurrection
of custom.”39 Each of these represents an aspirational outcome that seeks to progress the
law into areas not yet codified under current state practice. All exist within a framework
primarily contested via the two main opposing theories of ICL: the Traditional Custom
theory and the Modern Custom theory.
Roberts emphasizes the differences in the manner in which each mode
“crystallizes” into law: “traditional custom and modern custom are generally assumed to
be alternatives because the former emphasizes state practice, whereas the latter
emphasizes Opinio juris.”40 Goldsmith and Posner argue that “treaties, especially
multilateral treaties, but also bilateral ones, are more often used as evidence of customary
international law.” They add, “even more controversially, United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions and other non-binding statements and resolutions by multi-lateral
bodies are often viewed as evidence of customary international law.”41 James Anaya
supports this view: “United Nations declarations are not legally binding, but they
nonetheless have some measure of authority and impact when they are invoked.”42
Roberts further elaborates on what she has coined ‘traditional custom’ and
‘modern custom’:
What I have termed traditional custom results from a general and consistent
practice followed by states from a sense of legal obligation. It focuses primarily
on state practice in the form of interstate interaction and acquiescence. Opinio
juris is a secondary consideration invoked to distinguish between legal and nonlegal obligations. Traditional custom is evolutionary and is identified through an
inductive process in which a general custom is derived from specific instances of
state practice. This approach is evident in S.S Lotus, where The Permanent Court
of International Justice inferred a general custom about objective territorial
jurisdiction over ships on the high seas from previous instances of state action and
acquiescence.43
This is important because this is exactly how I will be using the two terms and theories. I
also believe that ICL evolves, just like any other form of international law. Law

39

Id.
Roberts, supra note 15, at 2.
41
Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 21, at23.
42
JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, (2009) at 79.
43
Roberts, supra note 15, at 2.
40
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progresses to meet the needs of the now 194 nation-states acting in the international
arena.

1. Traditional Custom V. Modern Custom
Traditional custom is “closely associated with descriptive accuracy because norms are
constructed primarily from state practice – working from practice to theory.”44 But state
practice, I believe, is no longer the major trend for states to follow. In regard to the law,
“as the frequency and consistency of state practice declines, a stronger showing of Opinio
juris… will depend on the importance of this activity in question and the reasonableness
of the rule involved.”45 This applies more to the modern theory of custom that, I will
argue, is the most applicable for helping to codify not only human rights law but also
indigenous rights law. This is because Modern custom theory is more reliant on opinio
juris than on ‘hard’ state practice, which in any case is almost impossible to prove.
Although both theories have major flaws and setbacks, I believe that as the law evolves
ICL will be formed more through international consensus, partly through major UN
General Assembly Resolutions and Declarations.
Francesco Parisi argues that the traditional theory of customary law “emphasizes
the awkward notion that individuals must believe that a practice is already law before it
can become law.”46 In other words, law only becomes law after lawmakers recognize that
people already believe what the law then states. Legal scholars have increasingly argued
that courts have started to ignore state practice altogether. As an example, Parisi states the
reference by courts and scholars to ICL’s “prohibition on torture”, which exists alongside
the simple fact that “many states of the world torture their citizens.”47
The prohibition of torture is a clear example of how state practice has actually
become irrelevant to the international custom that you should not torture your citizens.
The prohibition of torture is an Erga Omnes obligation that no state is allowed to deviate
from, according to ICL. And yet, if we were to survey how many states actually refrain
44
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from torture and how many engage in it, we would find that torture is widespread. This
does not mean, however, that torture is not an Erga Omnes obligation, nor that it has not
been codified as ICL. It just means that here the opinio juris outweighs actual state
practice in the sense that the obligation to not torture stands firm in the face of states’
ongoing breach of the prohibition of torture. Thus, I argue that state practice, as
understood from the traditional view on custom, no longer reflects the way states actually
engage with ICL.

Another critique of the traditional view of custom comes from Goldsmith and Posner:
the traditional paradigm does not explain how customary international law emerges
from disorder, or how it changes over time… The traditional account also cannot
explain the fact that states frequently change their views on the content of customary
international law, often during very short periods of time… In addition, it does not
explain why states sometimes say that they will abide by particular customary
international laws and then violate their promises…finally; the traditional account
does not explain why states comply with customary international law.48
2. Modern Custom
The term that has been coined as modern custom is neither a ‘modern’ nor a
contemporary or even a new theory. The notion of putting more emphasis and reliance on
opinio juris as an element of ICL can be traced back to the German Historical School of
Thought.49 The German Historical School was the first “to introduce the subjective
element in the definition of ‘custom,’50 thus, it was not a ‘creation of international law’,
but of this school of thought within the private law sphere.51 According to Jun-Shik
Hwang, the French Jurist and scholar François Gény built on the concept from the
German Historical school and coined the term Opinio juris “for the first time to explain
the psychological element of customary law in 1899.”52 Under the German Historical
theory on opinio juris they saw law as the will of man; they called this “volksgeist’, or
48
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the will of the people, or nation, and “not something willed or arbitrary.”53 This school of
thought rejected the Traditional theory on custom, declaring the opinio juris, or will of
the people primary. And so traditional custom could not become “legislation as the
protagonists of the Historical School saw that it was something intentionally imposed on
the people, not spontaneously created by them.”54
According to Hwang, these scholarly works on the creation and necessity of opinio
juris were forgotten in the scholarly literature of their time.55 It was not until the
twentieth century that the notion of opinio juris was used as part of ICL.56 This is
historically seen as the beginning of the school of thought some have called the
‘subjective element’ in ICL. It is based on the ideology that customs should be based
upon the will of the people, not forced upon them. However, even this very ideology has
shifted. While, the modern custom theory that I am using in my paper argues for the
usage of opinio juris over state practice, it is not invoking the ‘volksgeist’ notion that the
German Historical school of thought introduced. Modern custom, although invoking
opinio juris usage over state practice, is not declaring that ICL is ‘spontaneous’ in nature,
nor that it is framed within a ‘declaratory’ frame, but rather is a ‘constitutive’ view. By
this, I am saying that in the declarative view, “the opinio juris is an opinion, or a
conviction, of states that something already is law, not a will that something became
law.”57 Under the ‘constitutive’ view, “the opinio juris is the direct reason for the
custom’s binding character.”58 The modern custom embodies the core belief of both, that
the state acted in conformity with the belief that something has become ‘law’, and there
was a legal obligation to follow the custom, but also that there is proof of states’
compliance with the opinio juris of the principle being followed.59
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The contemporary view and theory of Modern custom supports the view that
custom has progressed and is more in tune with the world’s needs and the evolution of
international law. Roberts says Modern custom is created through a “deductive process
that begins with general statements of rules rather than particular instances of practice.”60
The modern custom ‘approach’ focuses on the concept of opinio juris instead of the
traditional approach to custom that emphasizes state practice.61 Modern custom theory
“relies primarily on statements rather than actions.”6263 It is important to emphasize,
“modern custom is not a new system of law, rather an evolvement from the traditional
view on customary international law.”64 The theory of emphasizing the importance of
opinio juris over state practice in the creation of human rights customs is also not new,
but rather an evolution from the German Historical school of thought.
However, the modern theory that Roberts is introducing is an evolution from the
“volksgeist’ in the sense that claiming that declarations have or have not became custom
depends on whether or not the declaration was “phrased in declaratory terms, supported
by a widespread and representative body of states, and confirmed by state practice.”
Therefore, modern custom includes both a declaratory and constitutive view of opinio
juris on the formation of ICL.65 In this sense, modern custom is seen as guiding action, or
state practice, rather than waiting for actions by states to reach that point when they are
recognized as having crystallized sufficient to be considered worthy of becoming law. In
this vein, “treaties and declarations represent Opinio juris because they are statements
about the legality of action, rather than examples of that action.”66 Modern custom is
more appealing for codifying human rights norms due to its capacity to “develop quickly
because it is deduced from multilateral treaties and obligations.” A good example of this
is the merits decision in the case of the Military and Paramilitary Activities against
Nicaragua (1986). The judgment of the ICJ, Roberts argues, acknowledged this by
stating that:
60
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The court did not make a serious inquiry into state practice, holding that it was
sufficient for conduct to be generally consistent with statements of rules, provided
that instances of inconsistent practice had been treated as breaches of the rule
concerned rather than as generating a new rule.67
This shows that when a state’s practice does not accord with its own rules it can
claim the inconsistent behavior as a breach. By the logic of traditional custom, this new
behavior should force a change in the law because it supposes that practice generates law.
This exposes a fundamental loophole in the application of traditional custom; it pretends
to follow state practice but when state practice contravenes law, it relies on a record of
conduct that is “generally consistent”68 thus exonerating their own ‘anomalous’ breach.
Modern custom is not just more feasible when trying to codify human rights
obligations; it is more democratic and fair. When attempting to codify human rights
norms into ICL, they will in my opinion be more successful in being codified and being
respected if they are formed in a democratic way, where most states will have their say
and vote. This is because of the strong “moral content” of modern custom, as expressed
by Roberts when she writes, “Jus Cogens norms prohibit fundamentally immoral conduct
and cannot be undermined by treaty arrangement or inconsistent state
practice.”69Goldsmith and Posner add to this argument by saying that “increasingly,
courts and scholars ignore the state practice altogether.”70 Put simply, this means that
courts recognize that the practice of states is not always the most useful guide to the
formation or interpretation of law.
Modern theory of ICL accepts the idea that state practice can constitute more than
just the ‘physical acts’ of states. Some legal scholars are warming to the idea that the UN
General Assembly’s resolutions and declarations can serve as evidence of ICL, especially
if the norms the documents espouse can be shown to be regulating states’ behaviors, or
that the norms being expressed by these instruments are of vital importance to the human
rights regime.71
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It can be argued that “state practice is less important than custom in forming
modern law because these customs prescribe ideal standards of conduct rather than
describing existing practice. For example, the customary prohibition on torture expresses
a moral abhorrence of torture rather than an accurate description of state practice.”72
Although most if not all states adhere to the prohibition on torture as an ‘inhumane
practice’, few states actually refrain from this practice. For instance, the United Nations
General Assembly Resolution on “torture was adopted unanimously, but a much smaller
number of states ratified the Convention Against Torture and others entered significant
reservations to it.”7374 The point is that custom, understood through the Modern approach,
and when applied in the formation of law, guides lawmakers in ways that the simple fact
of state practice cannot. We can best grasp why this is so by clarifying the distinction
between the modern and traditional approaches to custom.
I turn now to some of the critiques of modern custom that reveal its weakest
elements. Roberts accepts that its “reliance on statement… to regulate global, as opposed
to regional or national” issues means it can struggle to respond to such “issues in a timely
manner.”75 However, I feel it is right to subordinate short-term responsiveness to fairness:
“Deriving customs primarily from treaties and declarations, rather than state practice, is
potentially more democratic because it involves practically all states. Most states can
participate in the negotiation and ratification of treaties and declarations of international
law and within the UN, such as the United Nations General Assembly.”7677 However,
“votes in the General Assembly usually receive little media scrutiny and are generally not
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intended to make laws.”78 While these critiques of Modern Custom highlight an
important flaw, Modern Custom does not claim that all UN General Assembly
resolutions or declarations will become ICL instantly. The norms that it does codify need
to have been regulating state behavior prior to the passing of the resolution or declaration.
It would also be important for it to pass through the UN General Assembly with few or
no votes against it, making it a ‘universal’ declaration of States’ attitudes towards the
principles and norms it is trying to declare. One of the strengths I perceive in modern
custom is its more democratic way of understanding custom. It is also a more progressive
way of codifying norms than, for example, the way that powerful and wealthy (and
mostly western) states have so often been able to “wield disproportionate and often
decisive influence in determining the content and application of custom.” While the
actual usage of opinio juris has been criticized widely, I would like to say that it is the
element that guides states behaviors towards compliance with the rules and norms – it is
what binds the custom to law. It is what gives moral authority to states to declare why it
is following a rule. The ICJ in the South West Africa Case (1966) made a
“subjective/objective distinction” by stating, “law exists, it is said, to serve a social
need.”79
Another weakness in modern custom is its reliance on ideas and ideals, rather than
on actual state behavior. 80 This reliance, according to its critics, opens too large a gap
between modern custom and actual state practice.81 Another important criticism is that
modern custom lacks a jus cogens norm, which develops with state practice. However,
modern custom often has a strong moral content compared to the laws enacted on the
basis of traditional custom, making it more applicable to modern human rights law.8283
Despite well-noted weakness in its theory, modern custom’s strong moral content of lex
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ferenda makes it more appealing for codifying human rights norms into ICL because it
helps codify customs that are relevant to the human rights regime. In addition, it more
democratically crystallizes customs into law, allowing all states to partake in the process
and not just elitist western states who tend to make customs based on their own interests
and not what is best for all, or what is best for the advancement of human rights. The
weaknesses attributed to modern custom are also general weaknesses attributed to custom
formation in general. It has been well noted that ICL has several weaknesses as well as
avid critics of this source of law.84
As states evolve with the systems through which they interact, the law too evolves.
It is through this evolution, I believe, that modern custom theory will become more
accepted by legal scholars within the human rights regime. ICL in general will always
have flaws because of the very nature of its ambiguous philosophical underpinnings. It
will remain a contentious debate. However, for this paper, the question is which theory
best expedites human rights law in the arena where international law and custom
intersect. I believe modern custom is the theoretical approach that best achieves this
development.
Roberts introduces an intriguing concept in regards to custom making, which she
refers to as “Descriptive Accuracy and Normative Appeal.”85 For Roberts, “descriptive
laws” can be discovered from observation and “reasoning” because they reflect
statements about a State’s actual behavior and what its practice has been (Lex lata).86
However, dissimilarity prescriptive law, a term that basically refers to what the law
should aspire to be, is hard to find by observation because it reflects states’ “demands”
about what the law “should or ought to be” (Lex ferenda).87 Modern custom is always
“prescriptive” because it makes claims about how individuals and states should regulate
their behavior. This is justified whenever we recognize that “what the practice has been
and/or what the practice” ought to be are not the same, revealing that we recognize the
need to change a behavior. A law is descriptive if it conforms to what the law has been or

84

See generally: W. Michael Riesman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century (1987). Faculty
Scholarship Series. Paper 732, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/732.
85
Roberts, supra note 15, at 5.
86
Id.
87
Id.
19

what the state practice has been. 8889
According to Roberts, “determining what the law is from what the practice ‘has
been’ relies heavily on the choice of characteristics under which precedents are classified
and the degree of abstraction employed.”90 This level of subjectivity leads to ambiguity,
and exposes the determination of law to disproportionate levels of influence from those
states with the most power. This theory clarifies this by declaring, “Description and
prescription are not coextensive because one reflects practice (description) and the other
directs practices (prescription).”91
Modern custom argues that the “justifications” for both the modern and the
traditional custom approach “align with “descriptive and normativity” where each keeps
true to its own theory and to the characteristics of each of the two theoretical
“approaches.”92 However, modern custom “derives norms primarily from abstract
statements of opinio juris.”93 Modern custom is based upon statements of “Lex ferenda
cloaked as Lex lata.”94 95
88
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I agree with Robert’s analysis of prescriptive laws because they reflect what the
law should actually be based on human rights and human dignity, versus descriptive law
that tends to be focused on state-centric rules and laws that only benefit those states.
Modern custom often represents progressive developments of the law masked by
phrasing lex ferenda terms as lex lata. Importantly, modern custom, as Roberts theory
describes it, has the ability to form a custom, even in light of inconsistent practice. This is
because even though states ‘infringe’ on the custom, the custom is still crystallized as
ICL. State practice is unreliable; therefore, relying on prescriptive laws and statements
from states and resolutions which espouse strong moral content represents the
progression of the law that is often lex ferenda imposed as lex lata. This is where ICL
needs to progress if it is to compliment and grow with international human rights law. As
the traditional theory stands, it is more in tune with state interests than actual human
rights.

C. Opposing views
1. Declarative Law: An Alternative to Modern Custom Theory?

Hiram Chodosh sees the definition and declaration of modern customary law as an
incorrect classification.96 Because it is so inconsistently applied, there is now a “modern”
understanding of ICL as the “international law not embodied in treaties”97 He argues, “by
continuing to categorize all international law as either treaty or custom, many
contemporary scholars have failed to recognize the emergence of a new body of
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international law, ‘declarative international law’.”98 Chodosh claims, “like customary
law, declarative international law is not based exclusively on treaties and may evolve.”99
He also acknowledges that “declarative law” has not been accepted as law by a majority
of states.100 The traditional approach, according to Chodosh, does not apply to
‘declarative law’ because, like the definition of Modern custom, it only requires one of
the elements of ICL.101 Chodosh sees ‘declarative law’ as Lex ferenda, as rules “that are
declared by law by a majority of states but not actually enforced by them, or rules that are
both practical and accepted as law, but only by a minority of states.”102
Chodosh argues that creating this new “third category” of international law,
(declarative law) would help “restore legitimacy” to ICL.103 He claims that extending the
traditional definition of custom to embrace modern understandings of custom only
“undermines much of the authorative force” of ICL.104 I do not think that the modern
custom approach to ICL undermines its force; on the contrary, I think it helps create a
fairer system of international law that gives it more authority. It does so by reinforcing
the importance of human rights obligations and enforcing these norms in international
law as binding legal customs on all states, which in return reinforces the significance of
human right obligations in international law. It does this by codifying norms with a
strong moral content. However, it is important to note that there is no legal enforcement
in international law, no mechanism that really regulates law, just the ICJ, and this has no
enforcement mechanism either. In addition, Chodosh claims that because “they do not
fully satisfy the criteria of either treaty or custom, declarative rules could be excluded
from any realm of law altogether.”105
The pros and cons of the traditional approach to custom or the modern approach,
or of declaring a new source of law, “appear to differ because the traditional develops
slowly through state practice, while the modern can arise rapidly based on Opinio
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juris.”106107 Scholar Jeremy Pearce seems to agree with the notion of a progression of
customary law. He writes that “the environment in which ICLoperates changes
constantly; this law needs to be flexible to be of use. Secondly, it has to be closely
aligned with the internal workings of sovereign states’ relations for it to endure in this
environment.”108 Pearce is saying that custom needs to “sit comfortably with state
consent.”109 He argues that it must also “regulate” nation states’ behavior for it to avoid
the illogical claim of being able to move “from fact into fiction or myth.”110
However, introducing a new body of law altogether, instead of utilizing what we
already have and expanding on it so the law evolves in step with the world it regulates, is
not only naïve but dangerous because it risks inventing laws too far removed from the
practices it seeks to regulate. This can result in creating more problems than it actually
helps to solve. How does creating an entirely new body of law help international law? If
states and legal scholars are hostile to the idea of expanding ICL beyond the traditional
custom approach and into the modern custom approaches, how would they react to an
entirely new system of law that extends from the same ideas as modern custom? While I
can see and understand the potential efficacy of establishing something new, something
that helps the law evolve, something that would help instantly codify and “crystallize” an
already existing custom or norm, inventing such a new body of law as Chodosh suggests
would, I believe, only create further and more complicated problems for international
law. States are hesitant about change within international law, and developing a
completely new mode of international law would be a lengthy process with no guarantee
that states would even accept it. I think that for the time being, modern custom theory
remains the best approach. We can not foresee the future, but we can take lessons from
the past, and the human rights regime was built to protect people from abuses in the past
that continue until this day, so perhaps the whole system will have to be re-worked one
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day. But for the sake of this paper this cannot be fully debated here. Chodosh’s
acknowledgement that few states recognize this body of law indicates that still fewer
states will be inclined to jump on board.
Unlike declaratory law theory, modern custom theory recognizes that not all UN
resolutions or declarations have the potential to become actual ICL. The law that is
derived from these international documents needs to have been guiding states’ behaviors
already and, more importantly, must be written in authoritative form and passed
unanimously by the General Assembly.
As it has been pointed out above, the ICJ has been inconsistent in its application
of customary law. Jeremy Pearce is not alone when he argues that “the International
Court of Justice in some decisions manifests a type of ‘reverse engineering’ in order to
facilitate a decision so that the law fits the facts.”111 Pearce also argues, “Charlesworth
supports this position stating that the court in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua may be criticized for the obscurity in its
judgment, which is at odds with the North Sea Continental Shelf Case.”112113
Pearce believes that at the heart of this ‘declarative’ “school of thinking” is
“Cheng’s idea of ‘instant’ customary law. He espouses the notion that customary law is
created by states through the medium of General Assembly resolutions that articulates
each state’s sense of agreed obligations.”114He also emphasizes Cheng’s view that
“practice is not required, and that a ‘single element’ custom is possible in cases when
such unanimous support exists. This ‘single element’ custom also demonstrates the robust
nature of ICL, and it matters little whether custom is defined objectively from a single
element. The argument that it is possible gives ICL greater scope to be applied in varied
situations.”115116 Cheng’s idea of ‘instant’ customary law espouses much of what Roberts
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declares as modern custom. However, instant customary law differs from modern custom
in that Cheng’s notion would mean that any UN General Assembly Resolution or
Declaration would instantly become ICL binding upon all states. Whereas modern
custom theory would codify only those Declarations or Resolutions with strong moral
content and that can prove both opinio juris and that the principle was already guiding
states behavior. Therefore, only one element from the traditional custom theory is
needed, and that one element is opinio juris.
All these legal scholars are advocating for exactly what modern custom is
attempting to do – integrate custom into ICL. This is exactly what I am arguing for. There
needs to be a more cohesive voice that can integrate all these theories into one cohesive
version of modern custom. Modern custom is not only a more viable option than
introducing another new concept or an altogether new body of law, it is the one that has
already been accepted in cases by the ICJ, the one legal body that regulates international
law. We should focus on what has already been established and what the ICJ has already
accepted to be part of international law. This way we can better utilize this body of law,
making it more applicable to human rights and, more specifically, to indigenous rights
law.
2. Anthony D’Amato’s Critique
Roberts accepts that “the divergence between traditional and modern custom has been
criticized as undermining the integrity of custom as a source of law.”117 Critics such as
Patrick Kelly argue that “custom is indeterminate and a malleable source of law, simply a
‘matter of taste’.”118 Anthony D’Amato is another harsh critic of modern customary law.
He says, “resolutions of the United Nations are not a source of law at all; if they were, the
United Nations would be a world legislature.”119 D’Amato also argues, “Conventions
simply create law directly for their signatories. Other misnamed ‘sources’ such as the
decisions of international and national courts and the writings of publicists, at the best are
Hiram Chodosh conclude that modern custom is really a new species of universal declaratory law because
it is based on authoritative statements about practice rather than observable regularities of behavior.” at 4.
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interpretative; they do not directly create law.”120
In D’Amato’s article, Trashing International Customary Law, he argues that,
“central to the world court’s mission is the determination of international custom “as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”121 He also claims that the International
Court of Justice “has been better at applying customary law than defining it.”122 He
makes the argument that the famous case at the ICJ, Nicaragua V. United States (1986),
“was not forged out of the heart of adversarial confrontation. Instead, it reveals the judges
of the world court deciding the content of customary international law on a tabula rasa.
Sadly it reveals that the judges have little idea about what they are doing.”123 He goes on,
“the court thus completely misunderstands customary law.”124125 He also argues that
custom can only “arise out of state practice”126 and is not found in any declaration or
resolution passed by the UN General Assembly,127 and that opinio juris “has nothing to
do with the ‘acceptance’ of rules in such documents.”128
At the center of D’Amato’s critique of ICL is what he presents as illogical
connections between custom and international law. The problem, as he sees it, is that
custom cannot both create law and then require the law based on that custom, or an
element of it, to follow a pre-existing “obligation’ of international law. In D’Amato’s
own words, “If a custom creates law, how can a component of custom require that the
creative acts be in accordance with some prior right or obligation in international law? If
the law prior exists, would not custom be…superfluous as a creative element?”129 But
there is no reason why a law that has emerged from one custom shouldn’t then become
the basis for the interpretation of another custom, and for that interpretation to lead to the
120
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establishment of another law. Custom, as he says, creates law, but this occurs as a process
of one case after another. In other words, each formation of each law based on custom is
time-and-place specific. In an international framework it seems to me logical that a
custom that has become law in one time and place could then be used as a source to
establish a connection between a custom and a law in another. D’Amato’s approach
strikes me as a product of the traditional Westphalian notions of law; it is limited to the
functioning of individual states. As the international interactions between 194 states
increase almost exponentially, such notions appear outdated at best. I would further argue
that deriving custom from UN General Assembly resolutions and declarations is a more
democratic way of formulating a legal international custom than deriving it from state
practice and opinio juris. The UN is the one place where all nations of the world meet to
discuss critical matters of international security and human rights obligations. So when a
resolution is passed through its General Assembly in relation to this international security
and, more pertinently, in regards to human rights, it should be accepted as ICL.
If not, then why do states pass resolutions and declarations if they have no
intention of following or accepting them as one day regulating their behavior? If states do
not believe in human rights, then why do they sign and ratify important international
human rights treaties? They do so, in my opinion, because they believe them to be the
norm that will one day ‘crystallize’ into ICLand regulate their state behavior. Otherwise
why pass important human rights resolutions or declarations? Are they just empty
documents making empty promises? I do not think so. I think they represent the world
consensus at the time they are unanimously passed. Therefore, they guide states’
behaviors and customs towards these norms.
Hugh Thirlway comments on D’Amato’s approach by saying:
professor D’Amato… dismissed the terms ‘sources’ and ‘evidences’ of
international law as ‘best regulated to the domain of counter-productive
terminology’; and in effect [he] rejects the concept of sources as evidences also
inasmuch as they ‘create more problems and ambiguities than they can possibly
solve’. With regard to the division of rules into primary and secondary,
unfortunately Professor D’Amato permits himself a slight looseness of
terminology which makes it difficult to summarize his arguments. In effect, he
distinguishes three classes of rules: (a) rules which are the direct product of
international consensus, and which indicate to states what they must or must not
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do; (b) rules which are similarly the product of international consensus, and which
the ways in which rules indicating to states what they must or must not do may be
created, ascertained, or changed; and (c) rules which ascertainment of rules laid
down in class (d), and must indicate to states what they must or must not do.130
This simply supports the criticism I have made of D’Amato. As Thirlway makes clear,
D’Amato’s attempts to refute ICL become confused in interpretations that are, at best,
unclear. ICL and the role of modern custom theory in ICL may involve complicated legal
concepts, and these complications may be easily attacked, but that does not mean such
complication cannot be ordered and established as sound law. Indeed, the increasingly
complex relationships of states – and between states and their peoples – in the postWestphalian world require us to grapple with laws that can manage these relationships,
however much D’Amato would like the relative simplicity of the traditional legal models.
ICL is a complicated source of law, but this does not mean it is not relevant or that, as
time progresses and international law with it, it will not find its footing within the
international arena. The rebirth of ICL, has been very recent and it’s been resurrected by
the ICJ and human rights advocates because it is the best source of law to manage the
demands and needs of the human rights regime. It is the only way to regulate it and hold
states accountable for the human rights resolutions and declarations they pass within the
UN General Assembly,
Pearce presents other theorists opposed to ICL: Schacher, who “states that
‘customary law’, new and old, are products of political ‘aims and conditions’”; Visscher,
who “states that ‘every international custom is the work of power’”131; and Byers, saying,
“‘although states are generally entitled to participate in the customary process it may be
easier for more ‘powerful’ states to behave in ways which will significantly influence the
development and maintenance or change of customary rules”’.132 All these criticisms
appear to me to share the presumption that supporters of ICL seek its success outside the
power relationships and political agendas that already exist between states. None of the
scholars I have presented argue that ICL should develop or be applied outside the power
relationships and the politics of present day international relations between states.
Meanwhile, Pearce offers his own view, which is that “Codifying customary
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international law into treaty form disallows the law to change and evolve, as is usually
the case with the creation of customary international law.”133 But, as I have pointed out,
the creation of ICL need not be any more rigid or fixed than other international law or
law more generally. Actually, I am not alone in believing that modern custom theory
brings flexibility and responsiveness to the codification of ICL.
Nicole Roughan, in her article, Democratic Custom V. International Customary
Law, maintains that “custom appears to be an undemocratic mode of order because it
lacks the very formalism and rational approach to decision-making which most
democracies consider vital for solving problems of disagreement.”134 She sees that at the
“international level these problems – the race of power, the dominance – are amplified
both between and within states, rendering custom a seemingly unhelpful and unattractive
basis for a legal system.”135 But I suggest that in seeking to avoid this ‘amplification’
Roughan shies away from precisely the complexities that face the world’s states as they
grapple with how to interact not just with each other, but also with the various peoples
residing within them. The “formalism and rational approach to decision-making” she
speaks of has been the very strategy used by some powerful states (not all of them
“democracies”) for “solving problems of disagreement.” Too often the ‘solution’ for one
state has been the problem – sometimes the catastrophe – for another state or people.
Also, her implicit accusation that those using custom as a source of international law are
irrational, seems to betray a desire for the apparent simplicity of Westphalian-style
relationships between states; a relationship, I have argued, that suits some states more
than others.
That such fierce debate rages between scholars of law over the pros and cons of
ICL seems to me not only healthy, but also essential for such law to development.
Nobody would argue that law has not evolved, and few would present this history as
without disagreement and occasional hostility. I believe that through these debates, and
through the increasing acceptance and application of modern custom theory, the 194
states and the peoples within them will progress towards the most democratic methods of
133
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codifying international law. More specifically, it is through the application of ICL, based
on modern custom theory, that indigenous peoples are most likely to achieve their rights
to self-determination.
D. Conclusion
I have critically analyzed and debated the two main theories of how to codify
international customary law: the traditional and modern theories. I have attempted to
explain why under the two main theories of ICL I support Roberts’ accretion of modern
custom and all it has been able to encompass. In light of today’s globalized world, and at
a crucial point in our history, especially in reference to human rights laws and customs, it
has become important to find the best possible method to codify these norms into ICL.
This is crucial because we need to evolve international law to match the fast-paced
system of human rights. In this way it can help codify these norms and help regulate
states’ behavior and compliance with human rights norms and obligations under ICL.
This is why I believe that traditional custom should no longer be used to codify
international custom. Due to ambiguities inherent in its establishment, state practice alone
is not effective for deciding if a custom has reached an international legal status, or if it
has ‘crystallized’ into ICL. Nor can we access state practice democratically under this
model because of the likelihood of more powerful states dominating this process. The
United Nations Charters clearly states that all states are created equal and are equal
before international law. This may be true in theory, but in practice, it is not. When the
Permanent Court of Justice, in its infamous SS. Lotus Case, relied on just six western
states as evidence of state practice, the system of law was revealed as not only
undemocratic, but unfair. We cannot just look at western states for proof of state practice;
we must look at all states to determine whether or not the vast majority of states are
participating in a norm or not. This is why modern custom is the best system to
democratically form a custom into ICL. In line with the modern custom theory, UN
General Assembly resolutions are considered to be part of this ICL regime, and can
embody general norms and customs already regulating states behavior. More importantly,
it leads to a more fair and democratic process of declaring ICL – one country, one vote,
and one voice. In UN General Assembly resolutions of declaration voting sessions, no
state’s vote weighs more than another’s; they are all equal, as it should be.
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II Self-Determination: The Right of Indigenous Peoples under Customary
International Law
The Cree’s have no Interest in secession from Canada. We want selfdetermination to be recognized so that we can finally become part of Canada ~
Cree Leader Ted Moses136

A. Introduction
In chapter one, I established that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is best
advanced through a modern custom approach to ICL. This involved establishing the logic
of the legal interpretive framework. In this second chapter, I will explore the ways this
framework is applied and the specific declarations that allow this application to advance
not only individual rights to self-determination, as recognized with traditional approaches
to ICL, but also that these rights extend to indigenous peoples. Essentially, the modern
custom theory recognizes that the traditional approach does not, by protecting individual
rights, protect the rights of indigenous peoples within nation-states; in response, the
modern approach formulates a legal framework to grant such rights to these peoples’
within nation states.
Once I have discussed exactly how the various UN declarations advance indigenous
peoples’ rights to self-determination, I will present and analyze case studies to prove the
argument of chapter one: the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples under
international law has been codified as customary international law (CIL) under the
modern custom theory.
The right to self-determination is a people’s right to manifest and govern their own
lives within their communities. It is the ability to control their own civil and cultural
affairs without the interference of state governments and institutions, the ability to control
their own lives to ensure their survival. Under current international law, the right to selfdetermination has been codified into the two international covenants, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), often referred to as Common Article 1
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for the commonality of Article 1 in both covenants. Common Article 1 states:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence137
Those supporting traditional custom theory would agree that these two articles
define the right to self-determination. However, they would say that these articles do not
apply to indigenous peoples because, as they were conceived and established, these
articles were written in response to the needs of a post-colonial scenario in which
indigenous peoples were considered to be under the jurisdiction of states and not the
international community. Proponents of modern custom theory, however, point out that
the international law has evolved in line with the international community, which has
long since ceased to function as it did before the establishment of the human rights
regime we live with today.
The ICCPR and ICESCR “lay down the foundation of what has subsequently
developed as International Law of Human Rights.” 138 Common Article 1 is essential for
indigenous rights since it “reveals the reasoning that before any rights are enjoyed it is
vital for the people to become masters of their own political destiny.” 139 Therefore the
right to self-determination is not limited nor “restricted” to a political or even civil right
but is the “gateway to economic, social and cultural rights.” 140 The core idea of selfdetermination is that peoples and individuals as human beings have the right to manifest
and control their own destiny and be “free of alien masters and not be handled about from
137
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sovereign to sovereign as if they were property.” 141 They and only they have the right to
choose the government structure that will dictate their rules and norms. 142
In line with the modern custom theory, human right principles enshrined in UN
Declarations or Resolutions can be crystallized into ICL. This is based on the strong
opinio juris and the strong moral content of the document being passed through the
General Assembly, as detailed in chapter one. The right to self-determination as granted
under Common Article 1 of the international covenant stipulates that peoples have the
right to seek self-determination but at the same time respect the territorial integrity of the
state, except in extreme cases where secession is the only possible solution left for
survival. This notion has also been upheld by the ICJ, as in the cases of Namibia and
Western Sahara, and with the “Legality of the Separation Barrier in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories.
As discussed in chapter one, the ICJ held that the right to self-determination is an
erga omnes obligation under international law that no state is allowed to derogate from.
Indigenous peoples have the fundamental right to manifest their own destiny and with
their own political systems manage and express their culture, resist assimilation policies,
keep their language of origin and create an educational system that meets their needs. In
other words, they have the right to internal self-determination.
Under modern custom theory, United Nations General Assembly Declarations can be
sought to embody norms of customary international law if the norms are articulated into
forceful terms and the opinio juris of the Declaration is already guiding states behaviors.
The United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) and the UN General Assembly
(UNGA) Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) has granted and
declared that indigenous peoples are beneficiaries of this legal principle. This ICL
codification of their right to self-determination occurred under the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as internal self-determination or autonomy.
Article 3 of the UNDRIP reads exactly as Common Article 1, except it replaces ‘peoples’
with ‘indigenous peoples’.
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I will argue that the concept of self-determination has evolved in international law to
include both the notion of internal and external self-determination aspects. This
development of the concept has been addressed by multiple international actors and
instruments to include indigenous peoples. Most importantly, Common Article 1 of the
International Covenants has codified self-determination as a legal principle that has
liberated colonized peoples and States. I will start by distinguishing between the classical
model’s ‘external’ application of self-determination and the modern ‘internal’ approach.
B. The Classical Model (External) V. The Modern theory (Internal)

This section is divided into two parts: external self-determination, which I will refer to as
the Classical Model of Self-determination, and internal self-determination, referring to
the Modern theory of self-determination, or autonomy.143
The right to external self-determination is the “right of the people to be independent
and free from outside interference.” 144 This Classical Model has been primarily entailed
the notion of the decolonization process in the 1960s. 145It was further legalized by the
United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples that stated “the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights; it is contrary to the UN
Charter, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.” 146 This
very movement allowed Africa and Asia to seek independence from its European
colonizers in the 1960s. 147 However, this ‘Salt-Water’ approach is a limited view of self143
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determination if it ossifies into a rigid norm that prohibits the evolution of international
law. Unfortunately, despite the increasingly globalized world and progression in human
and indigenous rights, this is still the main theory of international law for nation-states
continue to keep indigenous peoples outside the benefits of self-determination. The saltwater theory clearly distinguished between the ‘over sea’ colonies of European and
Western nations and that of the indigenous populations that were integrated with
“immigrant populations.” 148
The salt-water theory has “challenged the resolve of indigenous peoples of the
enclave territories” 149 because it reinforces the notion of “sanctity of borders,” 150 and by
drawing so heavily upon the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relation and Cooperation Among States. 151 “This declaration
served to preserve the former boundaries and underpin the claims of states that internal
conflicts are exclusively an issue of domestic jurisdiction and not subject to international
scrutiny.” 152 But developments in indigenous and human rights and in ICL have, in my
opinion, made this theory outdated.

1. Internal Self-determination: The Modern Theory (Autonomy)
Although the principle of internal self-determination has created fierce debate “among
nation states and scholars”,153 one thing is clear; the vast majority of claims for selfdetermination are based on cases of internal self-determination.” 154 This paper argues
that indigenous peoples’ right to internal self-determination is intrinsically connected to
their right to control their ancestral lands and the resources on them. This view is
supported by the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Inter-American System
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of Human Rights. (I will shortly present cases as evidence of this connection.)
Legal scholar Deborah Cass writes that, “the definition [of the modern approach to
self-determination] was further elaborated regarding the manner in which the right could
be implemented. The right to self-determination can be exercised in one of three ways –
integration, free association, or independence.” 155 This means indigenous peoples can
decide how to position themselves relative to the nation states within which they find
themselves.
Judge Dillard wrote in his Opinion on the Western Sahara Case, “it is for the people
to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.” 156
Kingsbury notes that the “distinction” 157 between external self-determination in the
classical sense and internal self-determination in the modern sense is extremely important
“because, as regards indigenous peoples in both Canada and the United States, politicians
tend to ignore it and simply lump any claim to sovereignty or self-determination in one
big package.” 158 Kingsbury also argues that:
external self-determination arises when a people finds that this internal concept of
self-determination is not being respected – that fundamental human rights are not
available to them. They cannot participate in the system and the wealth of the
nation is inaccessible to them; they cannot exercise the right to take advantage of
the land and resources around them.159
In this way we see, along with Kingsbury, how the traditional approach to
indigenous claims to self-determination fails. Because it sees all such internal claims as a
movement towards secession, it refuses to address them. It thus determines the creation
of scenarios where the only way for such peoples to claim their rights is through
secession. It is by such circular reasoning that the traditional approach maintains its logic.
The modern approach, as elucidated by Kingsbury, not only exposes the traditional
approach as the self-fulfilling prophecy it is, but opens the door to managing claims to
self-determination in ways that can satisfy the indigenous peoples making them and the
states they live within.
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One of the international documents that has addressed the aspect of ‘internal’ or
‘autonomy’ in international law is the Declaration on the Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. It clearly stipulates that,
“implementation of the right to self-determination need not conflict with territorial
sovereignty or the political entity of a state.” 160 This has, however, been criticized as
limiting the force of self-determination for state-centric purposes.161 Therefore, there is
tension here between advancing the rights to self-determination of peoples within a state
and the rights to claim nation-state status.
I am arguing that the right to self-determination includes both internal and external
aspects. 162 It includes “interrelated political, economic, social and cultural aspects.” 163
Gros Espiell, Special-Rapporteur of the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, 164 has reaffirmed that, “among other things, the right of
self-determination of peoples means that peoples have the right to enjoy their cultural
heritage and ‘to determine, in freedom and sovereignty, the economic system or regime
under which they are to live.” 165
Self-determination in its modern interpretation has both an internal ‘autonomy’
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aspect and, in extreme cases, an external ‘secession’ aspect. 166 Internal selfdetermination does not threaten a state’s “territorial integrity.” 167 On the contrary, it can
be developed and implemented
within the constitutional framework of the state…autonomy can involve local
control over…education, religion, land use, taxation, family law, cultural
institutions, and municipal government. It does not involve control over foreign
policy, national defense168
The modern custom theory, by maintaining claims to both internal and external selfdetermination, is positive for the state in which indigenous communities live because it
offers a way to deal with an indigenous community’s rights claim without risking
sovereignty. Ideally – for both a state and the indigenous community within it – internal
avenues suffice for the gaining of rights to self-determination for indigenous peoples.
Nevertheless, the right to seek self-determination external, typically through a claim to
independence, should remain only for last-resort situations where doing so internally has
become impossible. This is complicated, however, by the fact that not all indigenous
communities constitute a geographical minority within the state. In some countries such
as Guatemala, Bolivia, and Greenland, indigenous peoples constitute a majority, and
often comprise diverse communities. I realize the potential problems this could have on
host states; if they have twenty different indigenous communities, should all twenty be
autonomous? This is complex. Theoretically, under my argument, yes; however, this is
something that both the communities and the government must decide without infringing
on indigenous peoples’ right to choose freely. Some communities may want more
autonomy then others. The extent to which each community needs self-determination will
depend on the current situation of that community.
The situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to region, and from
community to community, so all these factors need to be considered, case by case. Such
discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. I am not the spokesperson for
indigenous rights or communities, but I strongly believe in indigenous rights and social
justice. I consider the commitment to managing such considerations a small step forward
in repairing the damage and, in more than a few cases, the horrors that indigenous
166
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peoples have faced and continue to face. I see this as a small step in the long battle
against states for the full recognition of indigenous legal rights and communities.169
Although nation-states defiantly oppose the principle of self-determination for
indigenous peoples on an international level, most western states do practice various
norms of internal self-determination for their own indigenous peoples within their
territorial sovereignty.170 This varies from state to state and is influenced by the “local
circumstances” and historical narratives of indigenous peoples.171 The several different
forms of autonomy currently granted to indigenous peoples are: “(1) autonomy based on
contemporary indigenous political instructions, such as the Saami parliaments in the
Nordic Countries; (2) autonomy based on the concept of an indigenous ancestral territory,
such as the arrangement for the Comaraca, Kuna Yala in Panama; and (3) regional
autonomy within the state, such as the Nunavut Territory in Canada and the indigenous
autonomous regions in the Philippines”172

C. Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination under the Modern Theory of
International Customary Law
International law has evolved and progressed from merely being concerned with the
rights of states to being concerned with the rights of “individuals and collectives rights as
human beings.”173 The concept of self-determination has also evolved into “a legal
169
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precept benefiting human beings as human beings and not as sovereign entities as
such.”174Although the right to self-determination embodied in Article 3 of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is a non-binding legal
document, it carries political weight and “legal significance for the development of
customary international law.”175 According to Koivurova even with these differences,
“these processes have much in common in that the main legal source they rely on is
Article 1 common in the two Covenants.”176 As I have asserted, modern custom theory of
international law allows United Nations Declarations to become ICL, as long as legal
principles are espoused that are already guiding states behaviors with strong opinio juris.
Article 3 of the UNDRIP has been codified as ICL. It reads exactly as Common
Article 1 of the International Covenants, stipulating that, “Indigenous peoples have the
right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”177 This is then
defined as internal self-determination by Article 4: “Indigenous peoples… have the right
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.”178 In the preamble of
UNDRIP, the Declaration states in authoritative terms that this right has been granted by
various international instruments under international law.179
Article 46 also makes this point very clear, where it states that nothing in the
Declaration should be construed as granting indigenous peoples the right to independence
or secession from the state. It states, while exercising their right to self-determination, it
may not “dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity
of sovereign and independent States.”180 However, the preamble of UNDRIP contains the
caveat that this is true “Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to
deny any person their right to self-determination, exercised in conformity with
174

Id.
Timo Koivurova, From High Hopes to Disillusionment:Indigenous Peoples' Struggle to (re)Gain Their
Right to Self-determination, INT’L J. MINORITY & GR. RIGHTS, 15 (2008) a 4.
176
Id. at 5.
177
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 13
September 2007.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
175

40

international law.”181
The Declaration passed through the UN General Assembly with only four countries
voting against. However, two of those four countries – Australia and New Zealand – have
reversed their vote and endorsed the Declaration while the remaining two, the U.S. and
Canada, have declared they are revising their position on the Declaration. Both Australia
and New Zealand emphasized the importance of the Declaration for indigenous rights.
Australia’s MP Jenny Macklin stated the following in Parliament on April 3, 2009:
Today, Australia takes another important step in re-setting the relationship
between indigenous and non-indigenous… Today Australia gives its support to
the Declaration…[which] needs to be considered in its totality – each provision as
part of the whole. Through the article on self-determination, the declaration
recognizes the entitlement of indigenous peoples to have control over their
destiny182
This is important because, although technically UN Declarations are non-binding,
states are taking them seriously enough for them to guide state behavior; states like
Australia and New Zealand are espousing opinio juris in their reversal statements. This
further validates the belief that the UNDRIP can espouse ICL and that the right to
internal self-determination has been crystallized into ICL.
James Anaya contends that the UNDRIP “has a formal status like that of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”183 He also argues that the Declaration should
be understood to “reflect, to some extent, a norm of customary international law.”184
Anaya contends that ICL “crystallizes” when a vast majority of states “converge on a
common understanding of the norms content and expect future behavior to confirm to the
norm.”185 Here Anaya is in line with my argument in chapter one. Although the
Declaration is non-binding, “the standards they set were already guiding states
behavior.”186
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Scholars such as Richard Falk have questioned whether it “is now widely enough
endorsed by states to qualify as a norm of customary international law?”187 This reserve
seems to reflect a widespread fear of the UN Declaration becoming ICL because “articles
4 and 26 imply that the Declaration buttresses notions of greater autonomy and selfdetermination for indigenous groups." But comments by Anaya, one of the foremost
writers on indigenous rights, support the notion that "self-determination is widely
acknowledged to be a principle of customary international law and even Jus cogens, a
peremptory norm." Article 46 of the Declaration, on the other hand, does limit the right
to self-determination,”188granting only the right to internal self-determination, and
certainly not secession from the state.189 An important point to state here is that:
at particular points, customary international law likewise created obligations that
ran in favor of individuals and against states…the fundamental goal of the
‘Universal Declaration’ was to expand these examples to the broad field of
international rights, both by inspiring express adoption in future formal treaties
and by initiating the dialogue and actions necessary for the recognition of
international customary law190
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), declared by the UN General
Assembly in 1948, can be interpreted as espousing the same idea. As human rights have
become increasingly important in international law, the UDHR has become binding on
states and is the foundation upon which human rights law has developed.191 The UDHR
“has become customary international law or been translated into treaty form.”192
We should try to understand the role of the UDHR in ICL outside its broader legal
context. John Dugard, author of The influence of the Universal Declaration in Law,
states, “today it is pointless to examine the UDHR as ‘law’ without an examination of its
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legally binding offspring, the Covenants. They, together with the UDHR and the Optional
Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' constitute the International Bill of
Rights.” 193 He also acknowledges:
Today there is no doubt that the human rights provisions of the Charter are legally
binding. The International Court of Justice confirmed this in the Namibia Opinion
of 1971.194
The Nicaragua case from the ICJ confirmed this belief195 that a United Nations
Declaration can have legally binding principles upon all states when it ruled that
“evidence of opinio juris, may be deduced from United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions.”196 Cass argues, “Resolutions 1514, 1541, and 2625 indicate a belief within
the international community that self-determination is part of customary international
law.”197
While I am arguing that the UNDRIP has espoused an opinio juris consensus from
states and thus can embody principles of ICL, scholars and states still debate the capacity
of indigenous claims to achieve the status of opinio juris.198 I acknowledge that this is
harder to prove as a factual, evidence-based practice than at the theoretical level. I have
no doubt though that the endeavor to translate the core ideas in this theory into law will
continue to move towards more regular legal practice; the case studies I will shortly
present encourage this belief.
This debate is also on “whether there is a consensus among states that they are under
obligation to recognize certain indigenous claims as binding customary international
law.”199 Ougamanom argues that:
Raidza Torres argued that international legal developments on indigenous peoples
have emerged as a normative regime. According to her, there is a non-binding
moral obligation among states to respect the norms that have emerged concerning
193
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dealings with the indigenous populations. Torres argued that the effects of the
proliferation of domestic and international declarations, studies, working groups
and state practices dealing with indigenous concerns is to ‘demonstrate an
emerging norm in the protection of cultural, land, welfare, and self-determination
rights within a particular context of each aboriginal group.200
Again we find evidence for a progression, an evolution in the interpretation of ICL via a
range of declarations. Each of these emerged from evidence-based theoretical responses
to the plight of various peoples. Ougamanom also supports this notion of a transition
from theory to law when he states, “contemporary international law has embraced broad
moral precepts among its constitutional elements, particularly with in the rubric of human
rights.”201 He also argues that under the United Nations charter and international
documents of international law, “the obligation to uphold human rights has crystallized as
general international law.”202 He agrees with other legal scholars who have, in my view
rightly, “Linked the notion of Opinio juris to the subjective principles of humanity,
morality, religion, reason and natural law.”203
Self-determination of indigenous peoples is a unique case that does not apply in the
same manner to other individuals or peoples. This is because of their unique history and
how they were colonized long before the international law of the 1960s forced the most
recent decolonization period. For indigenous peoples there never was a decolonization
period; they never saw their territories rightfully returned to them – these rights were
always denied.

D. Evidence of Opinio Juris on the Right to Self-determination of Indigenous
Peoples

While I recognize there are weaknesses in the examples I am about to present, they have
emerged from prominent, and important human rights bodies. They are the United
Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), the United Nations Economic, Social and
Cultural Council (ECOSOC), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Inter200

Id. at 44.
Ougamanom, supra note 186, at 49.
202
Id.at 49.
203
Id.
201

44

American Commission on Human Rights and a National Case by the supreme court of
the country of Belize. I believe that as ICL advances these scenarios grow more
persuasive as evidence because they come to support each other as precedents. In short,
they become the new norm.
Perhaps the most significant flaw at present lies in the fact that none of these human
rights bodies has a definitive enforcement mechanism, except for the Optional Protocol
for the ICCPR. The only legally binding enforcement mechanism within the United
Nations is the Security Council, and unfortunately I do not foresee indigenous peoples’
rights becoming a concern, much less a priority. (I am certain the US would veto
anything in regards to indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination before it even hit
the floor for a crucial debate. And it would not be alone.)
However, this argument could be said of human rights in general – there is no legal
international mechanism with the capacity to enforce human rights law. Although the ICJ
has ruled on important cases in the past, indigenous rights, including that to selfdetermination, might take a while longer before it becomes enforceable. The extent to
which these human right bodies affect world practice with their rulings towards
indigenous rights remains highly contentious and hotly debated. It has only been six years
since the adaption of the UNDRIP, but from observing how far it has reached and the
amount of attention it has received I feel confident stating it is on its way. I do want to
acknowledge and clarify, that there is no accurate way of claiming whether or not the
right to self-determination of indigenous peoples has been codified as ICL under the
modern custom. Theoretically, it has, but practically I argue that it is still on its way to
being crystallized as such.

1. The Human Rights Council (HRC) on Indigenous Rights and Self-determination
The United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) has been the most “active” United
Nations body to help address the self-determination of indigenous peoples.204 The UN
HRC has a “reporting procedure of the ICCPR and its optional protocol.”205 Through the
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reporting procedure, the HRC has been able to advocate and promote Common Article 1
to indigenous peoples, being the first UN body to acknowledge and accept that selfdetermination is a right of indigenous peoples.206 Although, like all human rights law, the
ICCPR has no enforcement mechanism, its Optional Protocol does. The HRC addresses
the issue of self-determination of indigenous peoples and submits reports on its
findings.207
The most important fact to note about the HRC and its advocacy for indigenous selfdetermination is that, prior to 1999, it protected indigenous rights under the ICCPR
Article 27 under the guise of the protection of minorities’ rights.208 The HRC strategy
change in 1999 was significant – it went from utilizing Article 27 to protect indigenous
rights as a minority to utilizing Article 1 to protect them as ‘peoples’ under international
law.209
The progression of the HRC in adapting Article 1 to address indigenous peoples’
right to self-determination under this article, “departing from its earliest” focus under
Article 27 is extremely significant and of utmost importance.210 It signified that the HRC
was now dealing with indigenous rights as ‘peoples’ under international law. In addition,
in 1999, the HRC “urged Canada to report on the situation of its Aboriginal Peoples in its
next periodic report under Article 1.”211 The HRC manifested this approach again in 2000
when it addressed a similar case involving New Zealand and Apirana Mahuika Case.212
In this case the HRC stated:
The committee observes that the Optional Protocol provides a procedure under
which individuals can claim that their individual rights have been violated. These
rights are set out in part III of the covenant, Article 6 to 27, inclusive. As shown
by the committee’s jurisprudence, there is no objection to a group of individuals,
who claim to be commonly affected, to submit a communication about alleged
breaches of these rights. Furthermore, the provisions of Article 1 may be relevant
in the interpretation of other rights protected by the covenants, in particular
Article 27.213
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The HRC committee also has requested that states who under their own domestic
law recognize their indigenous population’s right to self-determination report to the
committee on their status.214 The HRC did exactly this in 1999 with Norway when it
stated:
As the government and parliament of Norway have addressed the situation of the
Sami in the framework of the right to self-determination, the committee expects
Norway to report on the Sami People’s right to self-determination under Article 1
of the Covenant, including paragraph 2 of that Article215
The HRC’s “concluding observations no longer hinge on the state itself treating
indigenous peoples as a self-determining entity; rather, the Committee has considered all
well-established indigenous peoples as being covered by Article 1.”216 The HRC has been
tremendously effective in safeguarding indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination; it
has been the major United Nations body that recognizes indigenous peoples as “peoples”
for the purpose of self-determination under international law and, most importantly for
this paper, under international customary law. The HRC has also “stressed that the
provisions of Article 1 may be relevant to the interpretation of other rights protected by
the Covenant, in particular Article 25, 26, and 27.”217 Therefore, for peoples to enjoy
their fundamental human rights to liberty and their full cultural rights, their right to selfdetermination must be upheld.
The HRC is a fundamentally important human rights body within the United
Nations; it is the body that overlooks the human rights conventions and treaties and asks
countries to report on the human rights situation on the ground. It has been cast as the
human rights watch agency within the United Nations. It was restructured in 2006, which
strengthened its mandate. According to its main website:
214
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The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United
Nations system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of
human rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights
violations and making recommendations on them,…The Council is made up of 47
United Nations Member States which are elected by the UN General Assembly.218
It is fundamental to the indigenous rights claim of self-determination that the ruling
body of human rights within the United Nations actually recognizes it as a legitimate
legal right of all indigenous peoples. It helps strengthen the claim that the UNDRIP
Article 3, that self-determination can in fact embody ICL.

2. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (henceforth referred to as ‘the court’) and
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (henceforth ‘the commission’) have
both adapted the text of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP). In its special report issued on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights
Over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Human Rights System (2010),219 the Commission and the Court stated
that they:
have also had recourse to the interpretations of United Nations human rights
organs and mechanisms in respect to the rights enshrined in the international
treaties monitored by these organs and mechanisms of particular relevance has
been the jurisprudence crafted by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in relation to
Article 1 (self-determination) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)220
The Commission and the Court also state that they view the “right to indigenous
property” as having the relative importance that UNDRIPS rights gives indigenous
peoples.221 Since the adaption of UNDRIP by the General Assembly in 2007, according
to the Commission and the Court it has played a major part as a “guide for the adoption
218
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and implantation of norms and public policies in the countries of the Inter-American
System.”222 The Court and the Commission both claim that the UNDRIP, along with the
systems of jurisprudence that constitute Corpus Iuris, or body of civil law, “is applicable
in relation to indigenous peoples rights.” 223 The inter-American System of human rights
has more importantly called upon all states with mandate to provide information on its
implementation of UNDRIP on its indigenous peoples within their boundaries. Thus, we
see the reinforcing of the norm that, although originally a non-binding instrument, has
enshrined by UNDRIP as a legally binding norm on all states within the Organization of
the Americas System. While not clearly declaring that UNDRIP has embodied ICL
principles, it is clearly saying that they are legally binding, and thus, I would argue, be
declared ICL under the modern custom theory. The Inter-American System of human
rights has clearly demonstrated opinio juris towards UNDRIP and indigenous peoples
right to self-determination.
Both the Court and the Commission of the Inter-American System of human rights
view the right to self-determination as a mandatory precursor to all other indigenous
rights, most notably land and resource rights. The Commission and the Court have found,
that a “lack of access to ancestral territory prevents the exercise of indigenous and tribal
peoples’ right to self-determination.”224 They emphasize in their report that UNDRIP
explicitly recognizes the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples as a
fundamental right. The right to self-determination has been found instrumental in all
other rights as mentioned before, including land and resource rights.225
This finding was best illustrated in the merits and judgment of the Saramaka
Peoples V. Suriname case (2007); the judgment was handed down only a few months
after the passage of UNDRIP. In the Saramaka Peoples case, “the court referred to the
right to self-determination in its interpretation of indigenous land and resource rights
under the American Convention Article 21. It noted that the committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural rights interpreted Common Article 1 of the Covenants as being
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applicable to indigenous peoples.”226 This also supports the belief that indigenous peoples
have the right to enjoy their own “social, cultural, and economic development, which
includes the right to enjoy their particular spiritual relationship with the territory they
have traditionally used and occupied.”227
This case was further unique in the sense that the Saramaka peoples were not
necessarily indigenous to the area per say. They were ancestors of the slaves who had run
away and had established their community in Suriname. The Saramaka People are “one
of six tribes of Maroons who have inhabited the in land of Suriname since the early
1700’s.”228 They are a unique community who follow their own “customs and laws.”229
The Court here applied the “same community property rights and principles to tribal
peoples who held the land collectively” and who had an “Omni-comprehensive
relationship” with their lands. The court stated that although the communities were not
indigenous to the area, they shared “similar” characteristics with indigenous peoples,
such as having social, cultural, and economic traditions different from other sections of
the national community, identifying themselves with their ancestral territories, and
regarding themselves, at least partially, by their own norms, customs, and traditions.”230
The ruling was based on the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the
notion of self- identification. Even more importantly, it relies on the UNDRIP Article 26,
stipulating:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason
of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use,
as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.231
While it only exemplifies one important case,232 I argue it establishes an important
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foundation upon which the Inter-American human rights system will operate in future.
The fact that this regional human rights body has formally endorsed the UNDRIP and
made rulings based on it, and only a few months after its adoption by the UNGA, has a
huge significance for its future legal status. The Inter-American system for human rights
is the Americas’ regional human rights body, the part of the world that is home to the
majority of indigenous populations, and where most indigenous communities are
struggling for state recognition of their rights as indigenous peoples. Therefore, this has
become ICL in the Western hemisphere, which is important in establishing indigenous
rights laws in the Americas. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is a regional
human rights body which, like its counterparts the European Court of Human Rights and
the African court on Human and people’s Rights, helps establish important case law in
regards to indigenous peoples.

3. Belize case

While this case was not part of the Inter-American System of human rights, it transpired
in one of its member states. I include it in this section for its relevance to the main
argument in this thesis. Belize may not be an influential country politically, but I am
addressing it from the theoretical notion that under the UN Charter all states are created
equal, even if in practicality this is not the case. The ruling of Belize’s Supreme Court
reflects ICL in the Americas; therefore, I believe it is directly linked to this argument.
The Supreme Court of Belize’s ruling in the case of Aurelio Cal, et al. V. Attorney
General of Belize (2007), in supporting the “collective and individual land rights to the
traditionally owned land and resources of Mayan communities in Southern Belize,” cited
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which had been adapted by the
United Nations General Assembly just a month earlier. In the case, the “Supreme Court
found it to be of importance that Belize had voted for the UNDRIP, which embodies
“general principles of international law relating to indigenous peoples and their lands and
resources.”233
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The Chief Justice presiding over this case in his decision declared:
This Declaration was adopted by an overwhelming number of 143 states in favor
with only four States against with eleven abstentions. It is of some signal
importance, in my view, that Belize voted in favor of this Declaration. And I find
it’s Article 26 of especial resonance and relevance in the context of this case,
reflecting, as I think it does the growing consensus and the general principles of
international law on indigenous peoples and their lands and resources.234
The chief Justice presiding over the case went further in his judgment remarks to
state, saying that the Declaration embodied “general principles of international law
relating to indigenous peoples and their lands and resources.” He thought it:
of such force that the defendants, representing the Government of Belize, will not
disregard it. Belize, it should be remembered, voted for it. In Article 42 of the
Declaration, the United Nations, its bodies and specialized agencies including at
the country level, and states, are enjoined to promote respect for and full
application of the Declaration’s provision and to follow up its effectiveness.”235
He goes on to state the nation of Belize is obliged under international law to uphold
this Declaration in “good faith’”, or by notion of Pacta Sunt Servada, something that is
usually only applicable to actual, legally binding treaties; this collapses a particular
distinction between the declaration and the nation state’s binding treaty, as well as
challenging236 that distinction generally.
This case is extremely important in the sense that it is the first time a supreme court
of any nation directly refers to the UNDRIP and bases part of its ruling on it. It held the
state of Belize responsible for ensuring the implementation and upholding of the
Declarations principles and rights towards indigenous peoples. It held Belize accountable
for voting in favor of it, thus declaring that since Belize voted in favor of the Declaration
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that Belize demonstrated Opinio juris towards it and the rights enshrined in it.237

4. The Saami Peoples Convention of the Nordic Countries

The final case I present is that of the Saami peoples of Scandinavia. The Saami are an
indigenous group of peoples who reside in mostly the Nordic countries of Europe. They
live mostly in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia.238 The Saami Peoples have been
granted greater autonomy by the Nordic countries compared to indigenous peoples in
other parts of the world. The Saami’s traditional homeland “stretches from a great arc in
Soviet Kola peninsula, across the northern third of Finland, and along both sides of the
mountains range which separates Norway and Sweden.”239 The Saami have suffered a
similar fate to most indigenous communities around the world: “subjected to
assimilationist practices, a development that was reversed in some parts of the Nordic
states only as recently as the 1970s.”240
The Saami have been unique in that they have successfully fought for recognition of
their rights in their Nordic countries of residence.241 For example, they managed to
establish the “Nordic Saami Council (now the Saami Council) in 1956.”242 The Saami
have their own parliaments in each of these Nordic countries and to a certain degree
enjoy autonomy.243 However, only Finland and Norway actually acknowledge the Saami
as an indigenous and unique group of peoples.244 This is crucial for their ‘quest’ for selfdetermination.245
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In 1996, the council appointed a committee to draft the Nordic Saami Convention,
which “was equally represented by three representatives from the three Nordic Countries
and three representatives from the Saami Parliaments.”246 The committee completed its
work in 2005, and submitted the report to the Nordic countries.247 The most important
Article of this regional convention was that it emphasized the right to self-determination
of the Saami Peoples. It stipulated in Article 3 of the draft:
As a people, the Saami has the right of self-determination in accordance with the
rules and provisions of international law and of this Convention. In so far as it
follows from these rules and provisions, the Saami people has the right to
determine its own economic, social and cultural development and to dispose, to
their own benefit, over its own natural resources248
It was written to reflect Common Article 1 of the International Covenants.249 More
importantly, the committee drafting the convention remarked on the fact that the UN
HRC has since 1999 approached the question of indigenous self-determination as
pertaining to indigenous peoples under Common Article 1. This appeared in its reports to
the Nordic countries in reference to the Saami populations within these countries.250 They
also referred to the fact that all three Nordic countries have signed and ratified both
Covenants, and that all Nordic countries voted in favor of the UNDRIP (except Russia,
who abstained).251 Critically, the committee noted that other “human rights monitoring
bodies have also pronounced Article 1 as applying to indigenous peoples; it also cites the
EU's Northern Dimension program, which has articulated the Saami's inherent right to
self-determination.”252
An important aspect of the commentary from the draft committee was that it did not
limit the Saami’s self-determination, as did the UNDRIP. It referred to the fact that the
HRC looked at the right to self-determination as it is written in Common Article 1.
Therefore, it should be understood as stating that in an extreme case the Saami would
have the right to secede from the state, if there right to internal self-determination was
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denied.253 In other words, where ‘internal’ legal frameworks have failed to deliver rights
to self-determination for this indigenous people, the commentary accepts that Common
Article 1 should be interpreted as legalizing that people’s right to achieve their right to
self-determination ‘externally’. As I have argued earlier, rather than leading to secession,
this encourages states and indigenous peoples to work constructively within the internal
framework. The best way to achieve this is through the application of modern custom
theory.
What the Saami convention helps prove, is that there is a consensus at regional and
state levels over the following: a) the right to self-determination does apply to indigenous
peoples, as written in Common Article 1; b) there is broad consensus on the acceptance
of the UNDRIP as encompassing legally binding principles that could embody ICL; and
c) more and more states are willing to apply these principles to their indigenous
communities to comply with indigenous rights law indicative of a strong opinio juris
regarding indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.
The Saami Nordic Convention, though yet to be ratified by these three Nordic
countries, would powerfully advance the political and legal discussion on the right to
self-determination of indigenous peoples. This is crucial for the Saami Peoples who,
although they have some autonomy in Finland and Norway, do not have full ownership
of their lands.254These lands are of vital importance to their survival, depending as it does
on hunting, and fishing.255 As we have seen, the HRC and the Inter-American Court and
Commission on Human Rights have confirmed that in order for any indigenous group to
enjoy their right to self-determination, they must have full access to their lands and
natural resources.
The cases that I have presented are evidence of opinio juris regarding the consensus
over the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples, enshrined in Common Article
1 and UNDRIP Article 3 as a fundamental and legal right of indigenous peoples. The
major body tasked by the General Assembly with monitoring the status of human rights
in the world, United Nations Human Rights bodies of the Human Rights Council, has
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recognized self-determination of indigenous peoples as a key tool for their survival. The
HRC has the mandate to oversee and give feedback to states in regards their performance
in relation to human rights, and especially with regard to violations of human rights.
The Inter-American System of Human Rights is the regional human rights body of
the Western Hemisphere that has recognized the right to self-determination of indigenous
peoples within the Americas based upon the HRC ruling of indigenous peoples being
covered under Common Article 1. It has adapted the text of the UNDRIP to further
empower indigenous communities throughout the Americas. The Supreme Court of
Belize has also upheld UNDRIP Article 3 in its ruling against the State in favor of the
Southern Mayan indigenous communities, which actually forced Belize to follow its
commitment to voting in favor of the UNDRIP. Consequently, they have declared that
the UNDRIP embodies principles of ICL that binds the nation-state of Belize.
Lastly, the Saami Nordic Convention sought its mandate from the rulings of the
HRC council on Common Article 1, and on UNDRIP on the Saami peoples’ right to selfdetermination. Most importantly, all the human rights mechanisms I have presented as
legal frameworks for establishing rights to self-determination recognize the collective
rights of indigenous peoples, such as land, culture, language, and resource rights. The
right to self-determination that all these mechanisms recognize is not just civil and
political, but cultural. They recognize that the right to self-determination is more than just
self-government; it’s about their survival as peoples.

Conclusion

The right to self-determination is of vital importance for the survival and full recognition
of indigenous rights. Their survival as a unique group of peoples is critical to our world’s
diversity. To me they represent a test of humanity’s commitment to the very principles
we claim so often to live by, and to the human rights legal regime built in the wake of
WWII to establish those same principles. It is undeniable that the right to selfdetermination has become a Jus Cogen norm, which has been legally recognized as a
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right of all peoples; it would also be “inadmissible and discriminatory to argue that these
people lack the right to self-determination merely because of their indigenousness.”256
The outdated notion of self-determination maintained in and by the classical theory
underpinning the salt-water theory no longer applies to contemporary international
realities of states’ inter-dependence. Invoking the modern custom theory to crystallize
this legal norm is necessary in light of the current conditions of indigenous peoples
around the world. As the United nations report of 2010 points out, they are in a very
critical position within the nations they reside within. Their full legal recognition of their
right to self-determination is their only hope left for survival as unique peoples.
The traditional system of customary law can no longer be applied. It is no longer
applicable to the human rights regime because this body of law is so deeply rooted in the
colonial and imperial mentalities of Westphalian sovereignty. It can no longer represent
what the human rights regime was built to create. In order for humanity to face up to its
own oft-stated commitments via the rights system it has created, we must recognize that
international law, and states’ place within it, has evolved in line with our understanding
of human rights
Indigenous peoples are not under the rubric of domestic affairs; it is the international
community’s job to ensure their rights are protected and safeguarded, that they are
granted their right to self-determination as they see fit for the survival of their
community. The system of human rights has affirmed and granted indigenous peoples
this fundamental right. We must hold law-makers and states accountable for the human
rights they pledge to uphold if human rights are not to become empty promises. UN
Declarations are not simply aspirations – they are a confirmation of the global world
consensus and opinio juris of the obligation to uphold human right obligations. These
legal norms are developed to protect peoples and individuals from abuses and tyranny,
and we must fulfill these obligations.
We have failed these peoples in the past, and we must not fail them again, and this
means having legal frameworks in place that accept that their survival is contingent on
their right to self-determination; it has been proven that without this legal right they
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cannot enjoy their basic human rights, such as right to their ancestral lands and resources
for their livelihoods.
I acknowledge that the modern custom approach to codifying human rights and the
right to self-determination does not answer all the questions, and might possibly raise
questions and difficulties it cannot yet fully resolve. Nevertheless, in the current state of
international relations, along with the systems that regulate these, it is the most
democratic method for progressing international human rights law and the best method to
crystallize important human rights norms and obligations into ICL. Law is created in
response to the social needs of a given population; it therefore needs to be flexible
enough to meet those needs and to evolve with it. Traditional custom theory does not
have this flexibility built into it; it was built to serve the needs of state-centric interests
and not the needs of the peoples or human rights. It proceeds as if the peoples of the
world were neatly contained by geographical borders with singular, homogenous groups
residing within them. It no longer accurately reflects contemporary world affairs and so
cannot properly regulate them. We must look forward so our systems of law can reflect
the global world consensus. Human rights were created to protect peoples from the very
atrocities committed against them by states, not to protect states who deny their peoples
their basic human rights.
I believe all the peoples of the world will be better served into the future if the
modern custom theory is increasingly invoked, not only by the ICJ, but also by all other
regional human rights bodies. I am hopeful that the effect will trickle down to nationstates themselves and help improve not only the status of indigenous peoples worldwide
but also the human rights regime itself. The Lex ferenda that modern custom emphasizes
is important to human rights, and indigenous rights fall squarely within the human rights
system that has grown and developed for the last half century; the very regime of human
rights is at stake here. We must use the development of this law to stand up and finally
hold all states accountable for their human rights violations, not just the weaker or less
politically significant states. We must take this stand against the tyrannical systems that
have been created to oppress indigenous peoples and their rights; we must work to
reconcile past injustices and move forward with indigenous peoples seeking justice and
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the full legal recognition of their right to self-determination as peoples under international
law.
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